When publishing my post
yesterday I noticed a spelling error in the blog title. Representation of
reference does not make sense, so I corrected the error. On a second thought,
in the Aristotelian framework, we might think about a referential event in the
world (a pragmata) that is
represented in the soul. For instance, we perceive a footprint of a horse on
the muddy path and an image of the horse comes in mind. So the referential
event causes a mental representation. This way of understanding representation
and reference is, however, precisely what I try to leave behind. It seems that
I have gradually become an eliminativist who would like the term “representation”
to be erased from psychology. Future
will show, if such a radical position is fruitful or not. For the time being,
it seems to be safest to retain the term and explore, if there are other ways
of using it in psychological analysis than the Aristotelian one that makes representation the primary "affection of the soul".
